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ENERGY IN THE NAF'A: FREE TRADE
CONFRONTS MEXICO'S CONSTITUTION
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF ENERGY IN NORTH AMERICA
When the three largest nations of the North American continent
agreed to negotiate the provisions of a free trade agreement, it was inevita-
ble that energy Would play a major role in the resulting agreement The
modem petroleum industry had its beginnings in the United States;2 the
United States has been, by any measure, one of the world's leading con-
sumers of energy;3 and energy has long played a prominent role in U. S.
politics and public policy.4 To the north, Canada has been an important
energy-producing and energy-consuming nation.5 And to the south is
Mexico, a leading producer and sometimes a leading exporter of energy,
6
where oil has played a pivotal role in the politics and national self-identity
of the Mexican people.7 Inview of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade,8 which provides that such a free trade agreement must apply to
"substantially all the trade" among the trade agreement parties,9 the neces-
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 605
[hereinafter NAFTA].
For general assessments of the NAFrA, the following major sources are the most helpful: GARY
C. HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, 'NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE; IssuEs AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (1992), a study published by the Institute for International Economics of
Washington, D.C., soon after the negotiations began; and GARY C. HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J. SCHOTr,
NAFTA: AN ASSESSMENT (1993), a study completed by the same authors after completion of the
negotiations that evaluates the extent to which their recommendations were followed; a
macroeconomics study, THm BROOKINGS INsTITUTION, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE: ASSESSING
THE IMPACT (1992); a brief summary of the impact on a major energy-producing state adjacent to
Mexico, IAN G. Ricti & DAvm HuRnumRT, FREE TR&DE WrrH MEXICO: WHAT'S IN IT FOR TEXAS?
(1992), from a comprehensive examination conducted under the direction of Professor Sidney
Weintraub at the U.S. Policy Studies Program, Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, The
University of Texas at Austin; and ROBERT A. PASTOR, INTEGRATION WrrH MEXICO: OPTIONS FOR
U.S. POLICY (1993).
For a collection of assessments of various legal aspects of the Agreement, see Annual Symposium:
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 27 INT'L LAW 589 (1993).
2. DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: TIE QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY & POWER 24-26 (1991).
3. Id. at 724, 745.
4. See, e.g., id. at 472-75, 674-76, and generally passim.
5. CIA, HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC STATISTICS, at 84-85 (1991). For a very brief history of
petroleum in Canada, see ROBERT 0. ANDERSON, FUNDAMENTALS OF THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 67
(1984).
6. See infra part II.A.
7. YERGIN, supra note 2, at 665-67. See also infra part 11.
8. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187
[hereinafter GATT]. The current version is at 4 GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE,
BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS, reprinted in JouN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND
THE LAW OF GATT 799 (1969). All three parties to the NAFrA are contracting parties to the GATT.
The United States and Canada were original contracting parties. JACKSON, supra at 898-99 (1969).
Mexico became a contracting party in 1986. See Richard D. English, The Mexican Accession to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 23 TEX. INT'L L. J. 339 (1988); John M. Vernon, Mexico's
Accession to the GATT A Catalyst at Odds with the Outcome? 24 ST. MARY'S L. J. 717 (1993).
9. GATT, supra note 8, art. XXIV, para. 8(b).
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sity of producing an agreement compatible with the GATT provided a fur-
ther reason, one based in international law, to address the issue of energy.
The unique place of the petroleum industry in the three nations ulti-
mately meant that the energy provisions in the NAFTA would have their
own distinctive shape. Since Canada and the United States had in 1988
already negotiated a free trade agreement, 10 which had included specific
provisions on energy," the negotiators were already familiar with the
problems of trade in energy that such an agreement would need to address.
Canada and the United States, with legal systems based generally on the
English common law tradition 2 and regulatory systems not too dissimi-
lar, 3 found important agreements on energy possible to reach. However,
the role of energy in the history and political culture of Mexico was so
distinctive that the discussions of this new trilateral agreement would con-
front new and unique challenges.
II. PETROLEUM AND MEXICAN HISTORY
A. The Petroleum Industry in Mexico
The results of the negotiations on energy in the NAFrA agreement
cannot be eradicated from their deep roots in Mexican history. The impor-
tance of petroleum to the Mexican people extends far beyond its impor-
tance as a natural resource, as significant as it is in economic terms alone.
As one author states, oil has been "inseparable from the concept of
nation," more an issue of "political passion" than economic reason. 4 Mex-
ican history has seen oil transformed from a badge of "foreign domination
and interference" to a symbol of "pride, self-respect, and independence."' 5
In the final analysis, it was not in the realm of possibility that months of
trilateral negotiations would overturn decades of history.
In a country with a turbulent history, the history of the Mexican oil
industry has been no less eventful.' 6 In pre-colonial times, oil was known
to the Aztecs and Mayans, who were able to make little use of this resource
seeping from the ground. 7 During this period, the strong influence of
Spanish law meant that such natural resources were owned by the State.'
8
10. U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, July 2, 1988, 27 IL.M. 281 [hereinafter USCFTA].
11. Id. ch. 9.
12. The legal systems of Canada are based on the English common law, except in Quebec, where
the civil law tradition in its French form prevails. CIA, THE WORLD FAcrBooc 1991, at 54 (1991).
This exception in Canada has a parallel in Louisiana, where the civil law tradition is established.
Mexico has a legal system based on the civil law tradition, although its constitutional theory has been
influenced by the United States. Id at 204.
13. Gary B. Conine, Natural Gas Transactions Between the United States and Mexico: Political and
Legal Impediments to Free Trade, 27 TEx. INT'L LJ. 577 (1992).
14. ALAN RiDINO, DISTANT NEIGHBORS 227 (First Vintage Books ed., 1986) (1984).
15. Id.
16. This brief summary, without which no understanding of Mexican energy policy or the NAF'A
provisions is possible, will follow the division into five phases found in DANIEL LEVy & GABRiEL
SZEKELY, MEXICO: PARADOXES OF STABILITY AND CHANGE 214-20 (1983).
17. Id at 214.
18. Id at 214-15.
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However, in 1884 a new era19 began when, under Mexican President
Porfirio Diaz, the Mexican Congress passed a new law that allowed the
government to grant titles to land to foreign companies.20 This change evi-
dently encouraged foreign exploration for oil, and in 1886 such activities
began in southern Mexico.2' The entrepreneurs conducting the exploration
efforts were overwhelmingly foreign, consisting primarily of American and
British businessmen. 22 Despite enactment of laws that embodied the con-
cept of private property rights in land and natural resources, the entrepre-
neurs did not avoid difficulties with property rights.' Commercial oil
production began in 1901.24 By 1905, in the wake of a recession, these
activities had already produced a nationalist reaction.25 Despite the fact
that the Mexicans retained the ability to set the basic rules for foreign
investment, the excessive dependence on foreign capital, and ultimately the
control of the Mexican economy, had already become a serious domestic
political issue.26 Despite these problems, by 1911 Mexico was exporting
oil.2 However, in that year the regime of Porfirio Diaz ended, as this long-
serving President fled to exile in F Cnne.
28
The adoption of a new Constitution in Mexico in 1917 marked the
beginning of a third phase, since this new Constitution included a provi-
sion, Article 27, that natural resources were the property of the Mexican
nation; this reversal of constitutional policy raised the tensions between the
Mexican nation and foreign companies operating in Mexico. 29 However,
production nevertheless increased. By 1921, Mexico was producing
twenty-five percent of world oil output and was the largest producer in the
world.3" After lengthy diplomacy by the United States, Mexico agreed not
to apply this constitutional change retroactively.31 However, in 1925, Presi-
dent Plutarco Elias Calles issued a new Petroleum Law that required the
19. A comprehensive history of the Mexican oil industry from 1880 to 1920 is found in JONATHAN
C. BROWN, OIL AND REVOLUTION IN MEXICO (1993).
20. LEVY & SZEKELY, supra note 16, at 215. See also BROWN, supra note 19, at 92. A second law
passed in 1892 provided that the owner of the soil could exploit subterranean minerals freely without
prior governmental approval. However, other laws obscured the true legal nature of the property rights
involved. BROWN, supra note 19, at 92.
21. LEv & SZEKELY, supra note 16, at 215.
22. See Brown, supra note 19, at 4, 9, 213-14.
23. Id. at 38-39.
24. LEvY & SZEKELY, supra note 16, at 215.
25. BROWN, supra note 19, at 39.
26. Id. at 91.
27. LEvY & SZEKELY, supra note 16, at 215. During the U.S. participation in World War I, 1917-
1918, Mexico was the source of imety-five percent of the oil imported by the United States. RIDING,
supra note 14, at 229.
28. FRANK BRANDENBURO, THE MAKING OF MODERN MEXICO 47 (1964). Porfirio Diaz had
assumed the presidency of Mexico in 1876 and provided the country not only stability but also a
centralized, authoritarian rule, see id. at 30,37-47. He also led Mexico toward an exceptional period of
economic modernization, and opened Mexico's economy, but never to the extent of "free operation of
market capitalism." See BROWtN, supra note 19, at xi, 92.
29. LEVY & SZEKELY, supra note 16, at 215.
30. Id.
31. Id. The diplomatic resolution was known as the Bucarei Agreements.
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oil companies to register their titles with local authorities and limited their
rights to fifty years.32 Although the law created the potential for a diplo-
matic crisis between the United States and Mexico, restraint on both sides
allowed such a result to be avoided. 33 However, during this decade the
focus of world production moved away from Mexico to Venezuela and the
Persian Gulf, where production costs were lower.34
President Lazaro Cardenas began a fourth phase in 1938 with the
nationalization of the oil industry.35 Mexico had already ceased to be a
major supplier of oil on the world markets, partly because of declining pro-
duction and partly because of the increase in domestic consumption.36
More than any other factor, the need to assert Mexico's sovereignty was
seen by the Mexicans as the reason for the expropriation.37 In a dispute
with the Confederation of Mexican Workers, the foreign oil firms chal-
lenged the Nation's judicial authorities. The oil firms refused to comply
with the recommendations of the courts on the improvement of the work-
ers' living standards.38 The words of President Cardenas are instructive:
It is the nation's sovereignty itself that could be exposed to maneuvering by
foreign capital, which has forgotten its previous commitment to respect
national laws, and is now seeking to avoid fulfillment of its duties as dictated
by the country's authorities. It is a clear-cut case, and it leaves the govern-
ment no choice other than to apply the current Law of Expropriation.
39
The United States, pursuing a Good Neighbor Policy under President
Franklin Roosevelt and seeking to keep the Western Hemisphere united in
anticipation of the Second World War, avoided a confrontation over the
expropriation of its companies' properties and limited its demands to com-
pensation.4° However, a complete boycott of Mexican oil products
ensued.41 Nevertheless, U.S. and Mexican negotiators were able to reach
agreement on compensation for expropriated U.S. interests in 1942.42 The
expropriation also resulted in the creation of the state-owned company
called Petroleos Mexicanos, also known as PEMEX, on June 7, 1938.43
During this era in the history of the Mexican petroleum industry,
domestic demand for oil grew with the needs of an expanding population,
32. Id at 215-16.






39. Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, General Lazaro Cardenas: Voz viva de Mexico 7
(Mexico City 1978), quoted in LEvY & SzECELY, supra note 16, at 217. Riding suggests that Cardenas
was insulted by a foreign oil company official who doubted Cardenas' word, thus adding a personal
impetus to the nationalization. RiDiNo, supra note 14, at 232. Riding also states that the nationalization
made Cardenas a national hero on the order of Cuauhtemoc and Juarez. Id at 233.
40. LEvY & SZEKELY, supra note 16, at 217.
41. Id
42. Id
43. RnDING, supra note 14, at 233.
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while discoveries and production failed to keep pace.' By 1969, Mexico
had ceased to be an oil exporting country.45 With the advent of the first
energy crisis of the 1970s in 1973, however, Mexico began to increase its
investment in oil and natural gas exploration, and soon Mexico became an
exporter of oil again.'
By late 1976, Mexico had entered the present phase in the history of its
petroleum industry as a major supplier of world markets. 47 By 1981, new
discoveries had given Mexico the fifth largest oil reserves and the seventh
largest gas reserves in the world. 8  Mexico sought to resist
overdependence on the United States as a customer, and President Lopez
Portillo ordered that no more than fifty percent of Mexico's crude exports
should be exported to a single country.49 Increasingly in this era, Mexico
began to consume, rather than to flare, natural gas.50 In 1977, Mexico had
made arrangements with U. S. pipeline companies to build a pipeline to
transport natural gas, a plan which was blocked by the U. S. Administra-
tion because of pricing issues.5s
However, as a part of recent economic reform, PEMEX has been
changing. The National Energy Modernization Plan for the years 1989 to
1994 aimed at producing a greater energy supply for a growing population,
increasing revenue, enhancing environmental protection, and decentraliz-
ing and reorganizing the energy sector.52 To support these objectives, it
should increase PEMEX's productivity, encourage the nation to use
energy more efficiently, create financing mechanisms for the expansion of
supply, diversify Mexico's sources of energy, and expand its presence in
foreign markets.5 3 In the three years after the adoption of this plan,
PEMEX had decreased the number of its employees and reduced its costs
by seventeen percent, or one billion dollars per year.54 In June 1992,
PEMEX reorganized its operations into four subsidiaries for exploration
and production, refining, natural gas and primary petrochemicals, and sec-
ondary petrochemicals, 5 As the negotiations drew to a close, President
Salinas summarized the state of PEMEX as follows:
44. LEVY & SZEKELY, supra note 16, at 218.
45. Id.
46. lIa t 218-19.
47. Id. at 219.
48. RIDING, supra note 14, at 240.
49. Id at 241.
50. Id. at 240. Natural gas was still being flared in Mexico as late as the 1970s. Id. at 239.
51. Id at 241-42.
52. HUFBAUER & ScHOTr, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE; ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS,
supra note 1, at 190. As part of a more general trend toward liberalizing Mexican investment
regulations, which historically precluded foreign ownership of Mexican companies, President Salinas
liberalized regulations with regard to investment in secondary and tertiary petrochemicals in 1989.
Dale A. Kimball, Jr., Comment, Secondary and Tertiary Petroleum Operations in Mexico; New Foreign
Investment Opportunities, 25 TEx. INT'L L. J. 411, 413 (1990).
53. HUFBAUER & ScHoTr, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE; IssuEs AND RECOMMENDATIONS,
supra note 1, at 190.
54. Id.
55. HUFBAUER & ScHorr, NAFTA: AN ASSESSMENT, supra note 1, at 36-37.
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The oil will remain Mexican. But we introduced recently to Congress a law to
restructure PEMEX and to form independent companies within it. No pri-
vate businessman can participate in PEMEX ownership, but they are wel-
come to participate in service contracts - not risk but service contracts ....
PEMEX can contract with private drillers, Mexicans or foreigners, but they
are paid in cash, and the oil that is found remains in PEMEX, as the constitu-
tion establishes.
5 6
The President also rejected the ideas of "crude sharing" and joint ventures
for finding crude oil.57 The announced reforms improved PEMEX, but
they failed to alter the constitutional principle that supported this state-
owned enterprise.
The policies and practices of PEMEX reflect the enduring impact of
the petroleum industry on the strong historical consciousness of the Mexi-
can people. That consciousness affects the domestic politics and the poli-
cies of Mexico today. The legal expression of this phenomenon is found in
the extensive provisions of the Mexican Constitution.
B. The Mexican Constitution and Energy
The impact of the petroleum industry on the economic system of Mex-
ico is shown clearly in its constitutional provisions. In contrast to the Con-
stitution of the United States, the Constitution of the United Mexican
States has extensive provisions on the energy industries. These provisions
continue to determine the content and limitations of Mexico's energy
policies.
The Mexican constitutional provisions on energy, announce the gen-
eral principle that "ownership of the lands and waters within the bounda-
ries of the national territory is vested in the Nation, which has had, and has,
the right to transfer title thereof to private persons, thereby constituting
private property.""s However, the provision also states that private prop-
erty may not be expropriated except for reasons of public use and subject
to the payment of indemnity.59 The Constitution gives the Nation the right
at all times to impose on private property "such limitations as the public
interest may demand," as well as the right to regulate the utilization of
natural resources which are susceptible of appropriation, in order to con-
serve them to ensure a more equitable distribution of public wealth, to
attain a well-balanced development of the country, and to improve the liv-
ing condition of the rural and urban population.'
With respect to natural resources, the Constitution provides that the
direct ownership of various specified natural resources is vested in the
Nation.61 These natural resources to be owned by the Government of
56. We had to react quickly, FoRBEs, Aug. 17, 1992, at 64, 66.
57. Id
58. MEx. CONST. art. 27, reprinted in CONST. OF THE COUNTREs OF THE WORLD 23 (Albert
Blaustein & Gilbert H. Flanz eds., 1988).
59. Id
60. Id.
61. Id. The Constitution also provides that only Mexicans by birth or by naturalization and
Mexican companies have the right to acquire ownership of lands, waters, and their appurtenances, or to
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Mexico include petroleum and all solid, liquid, or gaseous hydrocarbons;
mineral or organic deposits or material susceptible of utilization as fertiliz-
ers; and solid mineral fuels.62
The Constitution also provides that with respect to these categories:
ownersthip by the Nation is inalienable itprescriptible, and the expleita-
tion, use, or appropriation of the resources concerned, by private persons or
by companies organized according to Mexican laws, may not be undertaken
except through concessions granted by the Federal Executive, in accordance
with the rules and conditions established by law. The legal rules relating to the
working or exploitation of the minerals and substances referred to in the
fourth paragraph [provisions governing the ownership of natural resources]
shall govern the execution and proofs of what is carried out or should be
carried out after they go into effect, independent of the date of granting the
concession, and their nonobservance shall be grounds for cancellation
thereof.63
The Constitution also provides that in the case of petroleum and
hydrocarbons, no concessions or contracts will be granted, nor may those
that have been granted continue, and that the Mexican government will
carry out the exploitation of these products in accordance with the provi-
sions indicated in the respective regulatory law.' It goes on to say that no
concessions for this purpose may be granted to private persons, and the
nation will make use of the property and natural resources which are
required for these ends.65 All contracts and concessions made by previous
governments since the year 1876 which have resulted in the monopolization
of lands, waters, and natural resources of the nation, are declared subject to
revision, and the Executive, the President of Mexico, is empowered to
declare them void whenever they involve serious prejudice to the public
interest.66
With regard to electrical energy, the Constitution further provides that
it is exclusively a function of the Nation to generate, conduct, transform,
distribute, and supply electrical power which is to be used for public ser-
vice. No concessions for this purpose are to be granted to private persons,
obtain concessions for the exploitation of mines or waters. Id. It continues with a provision that the
State may grant the same right to foreigners, provided they agree before the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
to be considered as nationals in respect to such property, and bind themselves not to invoke the
protection of their governments in matters related thereto, under penalty, in case of noncompliance
with this Agreement, of forfeiture of the acquired property of the Nation. Id. It also provides that
commercial stock companies that are organized to operate any manufacturing, mining, or petroleum
industry or for any other purpose that is not agricultural, may acquire, hold, or administer lands only of
any area that is strictly necessary for their building or services, and this area shall be fixed in each
particular case by the Federal or State Executive. Id. at 26.
62. Id at 23. It is interesting to note that the catalogue of natural resources owned by the Nation
also includes "all natural resources of the continental shelf and the submarine shelf of the islands; all
minerals or substances, which veins, ledges, masses or ore pockets, form deposits of a nature distinct
from the components of the earth itself; .... " categories that would also include petroleum if not
already included. Id.
63. Id. at 24.
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and the Nation will make use of the property and natural resources which
are required for these ends.67 The Constitution also declares that among
the functions of the Nation is the use of nuclear fuels for the generation of
nuclear energy and the regulation of its application to other purposes. 6s
Nuclear energy may only be used for peaceful purposes.
69
After condemning monopolies in other areas of the economy, the
Mexican Constitution provides that the functions exercised by the State
will not constitute monopolies within the meaning of those provisions,
including specifically petroleum, other hydrocarbons, and basic petroleum
chemistry; radioactive minerals and nuclear power production; and
electricity.7 °
These provisions, the legal expression of a political imperative, have
had a profound impact on Mexican economic policy and the development
of the Mexican economy throughout most of the twentieth century.
Together with the relative size of the industry in the Mexican economy,
they have contributed to the great impact of the industry on the economic
welfare and destiny of the average Mexican citizen. They were also fated
to play an important role in the two most important events in the opening
of the Mexican economy in the later decades of the century. Those events
were Mexico's accession to the GAT1 and its joining with Canada and the
United States to create a North American Free Trade area. In the negotia-
tions leading to these two events, the enormous significance of energy to
Mexico can be seen.
C. Energy in the Negotiations for Mexico's Accession to the GATT
Mexico's energy industry was an issue at the time of its accession to
the GATT. 71 Concerned with the special role of its state-owned petroleum
industry and its immense domestic significance, Mexico attempted to fore-
stall any application of the GATT principles to the energy industry during
the deliberations on its accession. In its Memorandum on Foreign Trade
Regime, Mexico observed that its energy sector had been "closely linked
with the country's historical process."'72 Mexico had written the principle
of "the nation's exclusive and original ownership of its energy resources"
into its Constitution.73 The Mexican government "has consolidated its
authority over this sector in the context of a mixed economy.
74
67. Id. at 35.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id art. 28, para. 4, at 33.
71. For a more general examination of the issues presented by Mexico's accession to the GATI
and the resulting discussions by the contracting parties, see English, supra note 8, particularly 369-91.
72. Memorandum on Foreign Trade Regime 5, GAIT Doc. LJ5961 (Feb. 11, 1986).
73. ld.
74. Id The fifteen national programs adopted by the Mexican government included the "National
Energy Programme, 1984-1988." Id. at 7. It noted that an important factor contributing to the
expansion of exports in the period leading up to Mexico's accession to the GATT was the "steady
increase in petroleum sales abroad[,] which rose from US $ 557 million in 1976 to US $ 13,305 million
by 1981, annually by 2289 percent; in other words, petroleum exports increased at an average annual
1993]
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In response to questions from members of the GATT working party,
Mexico stated that the state has "exclusive and original" ownership of
forms of energy other than petroleum and natural gas, including the "gen-
erating and supply of nuclear and electrical energy.""5 Mexico stated its
belief that its full ownership of energy resources "implies no adverse affects
for international trade in energy resources. '76 The response from the Mex-
ican government continued: "Based on the principle of competitive advan-
tage, Mexico likewise considers that there is no distortion of international
trade in products containing energy resources as inputs. Mexico sells
petroleum, gas and petrochemicals to whoever purchases from us and at
competitive prices in the international market.
'77
Mexico was asked whether it was seeking an "Article XI exemption"7 8
for energy, including restrictions on exports.79 Mexico responded that it
hoped to be able to avail itself of all the rights deriving from its status as a
contracting party.80
In this sense, if it is deemed necessary to invoke any exceptions under any
article of the General Agreement, according to circumstances, Mexico will
avail itself of that right. In any case, Mexico considers that the energy sector
presents characteristics which are so special that it is not covered by the provi-
sions of the GATr, as evidenced by the fact that at no time have that sector's
problems been discussed in this forum, as the energy producing members of
the GATT well know.
81
In fact, although the GATT contains neither an explicit nor an implicit
exemption for energy, the problems of international trade in energy have
rate of 88.7 percent during this period. Between 1982 and 1984, they continued at a high level,
amounting to US $ 15,623 in 1982, and $ 14,968 in 1984." Id at 30. I a response to a question about
the meaning of the term consolidated, the government of Mexico responded:
The term "consolidated" in the context of the paragraph under reference, means that Mexico
exercises full authority over this sector. It does not mean that ownership of energy resources
can be mixed, since Article 27 of the Constitution of Mexico stipulates that, no concessions
nor contracts are to be granted in respect of petroleum and hydrocarbons and that the nation
is to be responsible for exploiting these products.
Replies by Mexico to Questions Put by GATT Contracting Parties Regarding the Memorandum on the
Foreign Trade Regime 10, GAIT Doc. LJ5976 (April 14, 1986);
75. Replies by Mexico to Questions Put by GATT Contracting Parties Regarding the Memorandum
on the Foreign Trade Regime, supra note 74, at 10.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Article XI of the GAIT contains the general prohibitions against quantitative restrictions as
app1ied to expot and imports betweet co ntracting parties, GXTT, supra note 8, art- XL, para 1, and
provides for exemptions for temporary export restrictions or prohibitions to prevent or relieve critical
shortages of foodstuffs or other commodities, id. art. XI, para. 2(a), and for other limited reasons. Id
art. XI, paras. 2(b), (c). It is difficult to construe these limited exemptions as a general exemption for
energy. Rather, exceptions to this general prohibition have more substantial justification under other
GATT provisions. See discussion infra notes 184-99.
79. Replies by Mexico to Questions Put by GATT Contracting Parties Regarding the Memorandum
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not been among the most significant issues addressed by the GATT.82
Problems in international trade in energy have tended to be resolved
through other means.a3 The United States, for example, has imposed vari-
ous restrictions on imports and exports of energy products based on
national security, on the grounds of its needs for oil."'
In its Report,85 the Working Party disagreed with any assertion or
implication that the provisions of the GATI' did not apply to the energy
sector. In particular, it noted that the tariff items in the energy sector sub-
ject to import and export permits were listed in the Catalogue of the Gen-
eral Import Tariff.86 Without questioning the principle of national
sovereignty over energy resources, a number of members of the working
party took strong exception to any interpretation that the GATI did not
apply to energy.87
82. Note the nearly complete absence of any references to energy, oil, and petroleum in the
indexes to leading works such as JACKSON, supra note 8, at 925-48; K RNET DAM, THE GATT: LAW
AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 469-80 (1969); and JOHN H. JACKSON, THE
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 409-17 (1989).
83. The more serious problems of international trade in energy have concerned, first, the
existence of an international oil cartel, see Jom H. JACKSON & WILLIAM DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, 982-87 (1986); and second, the related problem of oil supply
emergencies. This second problem was addressed by the creation of the International Energy Agency
by sixteen members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development under that
organization's auspices in 1974. Agreement on an International Energy Program, Nov. 18, 1974, 14
I.L.M. 1.
84. The United States imposed oil import quotas in 1959 as a security measure. 72 Stat. 678;
Presidential Proc. No. 3279, 73 Stat. C25 (1959), 19 U.S.C.A. 1862; Presidential Proc. No. 3290, 73 Stat.
C39 (1959). See JACKSON, supra note 8, commentary at 752. President Nixon increased the fees on oil
imports, a decision upheld in Federal Energy Admin. v. Algonquin S.N.G., Inc., 426 U.S. 548 (1976).
See EDMOND MCGOVERN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION 426-27 (1986).
At the same time, the United States has imposed restrictions on exports, such as the prohibition of
exports of Alaskan North Slope crude oil, the restrictions found in the Mineral Lands Leasing Act, 30
U.S.C. § 185(u)(1988), and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1354(1988), and the
compulsory licensing of refined petroleum products. McGovERN, supra note 84, at 440-42.
These exceptions to the application of the GAT principles can be justified under the GATT
articles providing General Exceptions, particularly those addressing problems of "short supply," art.
XX(g), and national security, art. XXI.
It should be remembered that the GAIT obligations apply only with respect to relations between
countries that are both contracting parties. MCGOVERN, supra note 84, at 423. For example, of the
thirteen members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, only six (Gabon, Indonesia,
Kuwait, Nigeria, Qatar, and Venezuela) were contracting parties to the GATT. CIA, supra note 12,
compare 379 (OPEC) with 368 (GATT).
85. Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Mexico, GATT Doc. U.6010 (July 4, 1986).
86. 1d at 23.
87. Id. In particular, some members of the working party disagreed with the assertion that
paragraph (g) of Article XX meant that the energy sector was not covered by the provisions of the
GATI'. Article XX of the GAIT, which provides for "General Exceptions," states in part that
"nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any
contracting party of measures ... (g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if
such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption." GATT, supra note 8, art. XX. Clearly, this exception merely permits regulations and
other governmental acts aimed at conservation to be enforced by measures such as quantitative
restrictions on exports; it does not exempt products that are exhaustible natural resources or those that
are derived from them, from the GAIT. However, all the GAIT obligations are subject to such
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In any event, the representative of Mexico informed the working party
that the inclusion of a paragraph on energy in the draft protocol of acces-
sion was not intended to establish special rights, but rather to underline the
importance of this sector and secure the acknowledgment of its constitu-
tional stature in Mexico.' Because of the provisions of Article 27 of the
Constitution, the Mexican government's sovereign rights over energy
resources could not be subject to concessions or contracts.89 Therefore, the
representative stated, the Mexican government would need to maintain its
system of export permits.' For security purposes, energy resources were
subject to import and export permits in a number of contracting parties.91
In the representative's view, Mexico's policies were consistent with the pro-
visions of the GAITY 2
The final Protocol of Accession noted the following:
Mexico will exercise sovereignty over natural resources, in accordance with
the Political Constitution of Mexico. Mexico may maintain certain export
restrictions related to the conservation of natural resources, particularly in the
energy sector, on the basis of its social and development needs if those export
restrictions are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption.
93
It seems clear that, to the satisfaction of the contracting parties, Mexico
accepted the notion that the GAIT principles apply to international trade
in energy. In fact, since the general principles of the GAIT, such as the
Most-Favored-Nation and national treatment principles, do not apply to
international investment under the Agreement's terms,94 nothing in Mex-
exceptions. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 744. However, even when this exception is applicable, such
measures may not be applied in a manner that would "constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination" or a "disguised restriction on international trade." GAIT, supra note 8, art. XX.
Professor Jackson notes that these qualifications are modified forms of the Most-Favored-Nation and
national treatment principles. JACKSON, supri note 8, at 743, citing GATT art. III.
88. Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Mexico, supra note 85, at 23. See Protocol of
Accession of Mexico to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GAT Doc. L/6010, and, Basic
Instruments and Selected Documents, 33rd supp. (1986), at 3-6.
89. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
90. Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Mexico, supra note 85, at 23.
91. Id. See also supra note 74 (examples from U.S. practice).
92. The Mexican representative cited Articles XVII and XX. Report of the Working Party on the
Accession of Mexico, supra note 85, at 23. Recognizing that State enterprises are unlikely to make
decisions about the purchase or sale of goods on the same basis as commercial enterprises, which are
able to make such decisions with a far greater degree of autonomy, the authors of the GAIT provided
that such enterprises must make their purchases and sales in a manner consistent with the general
principles of nondiscriminatory treatment. GATT, supra note 8, art. XVII, para. 1(a). The Agreement
also requires such enterprises to make these decisions in accord with "commercial considerations"
including Orice, quality, availability, marketability, transportation, and other conditions of purchase or
sale. Id. art. XVII, para. l(b).
In fact, the presence of state enterprises presents substantial difficulties to any international system
for controlling national barriers to trade and to the application of the GATr to Mexico's state owned
petroleum enterprise. See DAM, supra note 82, at 316-32; JACKSON, supra note 8, at 329-64; and
JACKSON, supra note 82, at 283-98.
93. Protocol of Accession of Mexico to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 88,
at 27.
94. See GAT, supra note 8, arts. I, & II. See also JACKSON, supra note 82, at 7.
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ico's accession threatened the Mexican government's ownership of
PEMEX. The provisions of the GAT for exceptions and waivers were
adequate to accommodate any problems such ownership might have
presented.
However, Mexico's accession to the GATT had implications that were
much larger and much more significant. Mexico's accession to the GATT
represented a revolutionary change in policy with regard to international
trade, a turning away from protectionist import substitution policies toward
a system more open to the outside world. 95 It was also the international
aspect of a new policy of national economic reform. Finally, it was the
crucial step that laid the foundation for liberalizing its trade with its neigh-
bors to the north.'
III. NAFTA's PROVISIONS ON ENERGY
A. North American Free Trade
As Mexico joined its two neighbors to the north as a contracting party
to the GATT, a general global trend toward economic reform and the
reduction of trade barriers was eroding a myriad of obstacles to interna-
tional trade and opening many of the world's most closed national econo-
mies. Across the Atlantic, the European Community was pressing to enact
a complex program to eliminate technical, physical, and fiscal barriers to
the free movement of goods, services, capital, and people across the
national boundaries of twelve European nations by the end of 1992. Four
South American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay) had
begun to discuss the possibility of a free trade area. The Association of
South East Asian Nations was considering closer economic relations
among its members. Reform in Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union was rapidly turning into the transformation of entire economies.
Throughout the world, a deep concern about international competitiveness
impelled national leaders to give a new and serious consideration to their
respective national economic policies and created a new willingness to con-
template closer cooperation with other countries. The leaders of Canada,
the United States, and Mexico were among them.
The successful conclusion of negotiations for the U.S.-Canada Free
Trade Agreement was a second major event leading to the possibility of a
three nation accord. With its completion, the outlines of a three nation
agreement became clear. And from that model, as well as the historic role
that energy had played, in divergent ways, in the three North American
95. For a brief discussion of this point, see English, supra note 8, at 366-69 and 390-91.
96. For a very brief discussion of the manner in which Mexico's GATT accession prepared both
countries for bilateral trade agreements with the United States, see English, supra note 8, at 391;
Vernon, supra note 8; and Rudy Sandoval, Mexico's Path Towards the Free Trade Agreement with the
U.S., 23 INTER-AM. L. REv. 133 (1991). Arguably, without Mexico's accession to the GAT, no one
could have ever seriously or credibly proposed a North American Free Trade Agreement. In addition,
the changes in economic policy made in association with Mexico's GAT i accession were also excellent
preparation for a trilateral agreement with two countries who were also contracting parties (indeed,
original contracting parties, see JACKSON, supra note 8, at 898-99) to the GATI'.
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economies, the contours of the provisions on energy and the major issues
to be resolved among the three parties were becoming clear as well.
NAFTA's provisions on energy, for the most part, have precedents in
the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement. 97 However, two major provisions
mark points of departure from this foundation. The first is the inclusion of
more general principles for economic relations among the parties in
energy. 98 The second is the general reservation of energy for the govern-
ment of Mexico. These two additions to the previous accord were related.
B. The Principles for the Energy Sector
As the negotiations on the Energy Chapter began, it became evident
to the negotiators that the principles governing the future of the relation-
ship would be as important as the more specific obligations included in it.
The Agreement sets forth three very general principles for energy trade
and investment among the three countries.99 First, the parties confirmed
"their full respect for their constitutions."'" Secondly, the parties recog-
nized that it was desirable to strengthen the important role that trade in
energy and basic petrochemical goods plays in the free trade area; addition-
ally, they committed themselves to enhance the role of energy trade
through sustained and gradual liberalization." 1 Finally, they agreed to rec-
ognize the importance of having "viable and internationally competitive
energy and petrochemical sectors" to further their national interests.102
While the three parties considered all of the principles important, most
promising among these principles is the commitment to "sustained and
gradual liberalization."'0 3 In effect, this principle obligates the parties to
work together to find new possibilities for reducing barriers to trade and
investment in the future. Mexico's reservation of its energy sector to itself
is clearly the most significant limitation of the NAFTA's provisions on
energy. The other provisions, while quite limited in immediate effect, nev-
97. See USCFTA, supra note 10, ch. 9. For exposition and commentary on the energy provisions
of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, the following may be helpful: U.S. Department of Energy
& U.S. Trade Representative, Analysis of Chapter Nine of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement,
Concerning Trade in Energy (May 1988); Andre Plourde, Canada's International Obligations in Energy
and the Free Trade Agreement with the United States, 24 J. WORLD TRADE 35 (Oct. 1990); Shelly P.
Battram & Reinier H. Lack, The Canada/United States Free Trade Agreement and Trade in Energy, 9
ENERoY L. J. 327 (1988); Philip H. Davies, Marketing Natural Gas: Canadian Overview 28 ALBERTA L.
REV. 82 (1990); Douglas F. John, Marketing Alberta Natural Gas in the United States after the Free Trade
Agreement: Negotiating the U.S. Regulatory Maze, 94 ALBERTA L. REv. 94 (1990); Dennis Stickley,
Toward the Integration of Canadian and United States Natural Gas Import Policies, 25 LAr & WATER
L. REV. 145, pts. 1, 2 (1990). Canadian energy policies are also considered in Conine, supra note 13, at
622-60.
98. There is no comparable section on principles in the Energy Chapter of the U.S.-Canada Free
Trade Agreement. See USCFTA, supra note 10, ch. 9.
99. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 601.
100. Id. para. 1.
101. Id. para. 2.
102. Id para. 3.
103. Id. para. 2.
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ertheless represent substantial progress in liberalizing energy trade and
investment.
C. The Scope of the Energy Provisions
The chapter on "energy and basic petrochemicals" applies to "meas-
ures"'1 4 related to these goods "originating in the territories of the par-
ties"105 and "to measures relating to investment and to cross border trade
in services associated with such goods, as set forth in this Chapter."' ' The
definition of energy is comprehensive, but somewhat narrower than that
under the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement? 7 Included within the scope
of the Agreement are such solid fuels as coal, coke, and peat, such liquid
fuels as crude oil, gasoline, jet fuel, and liquified petroleum gas, and such
gaseous fuels as natural gas, coal gas, and liquified natural gas, electric-
ity,10 8  and nuclear fuels."°  At the same time, the exceptions excluding
products from the definition and, therefore, from coverage are minor.
The scope of the energy provisions has another dimension, almost unprece-
dented in multilateral trade agreements,", a fact even more true for the
104. "Measure" is defined in the NAFTA to include "any law, procedure, requirement, or
practice." Id art. 201, para. 1.
105. "Originating" is defined to mean "qualifying under the rules of origin set out in Chapter Four
(Rules of Origin)," and "territory" means "for a Party the territory of that Party as set out in Annex
201.1." Id art. 201. The Rules of Origin determine where a good is considered to have been produced.
Essentially the rules of origin provide that a good is produced where it is wholly obtained or produced
entirely, or where each of the non-originating materials used in the production of the good has
undergone an applicable change in tariff classification. I&d art. 401.
106. Id art. 602, para. 1.
107. NAFTA uses the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System, as published by
the Customs Cooperation Council. In the USCFTA, the scope of coverage of Chapter 9, concerning
energy, is somewhat broader in that it specifically includes all of Chapter 27 of the Harmonized
Schedule except headings 2707 and 2712. USCFTA, supra note 10, art. 901.
108. It has not been clear whether or not electricity is a "product" included within such major
GATT provisions such as Articles 1, II, I1 and XI. Plourde, supra note 97, at 36-37.
109. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 602, para. 1.
110. A theoretical example of a multilateral trade agreement with the breadth to cover trade in
services and transnational investment is the Treaty of Rome, the founding document of the European
Economic Community. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC
TREATY]. However, in contrast to the NAFTA, which is strictly a free trade agreement, the Treaty of
Rome not only establishes a customs union within the meaning of the GATT, art. XXIV, para. 8, but
also contemplates the development of "an ever closer union," EEC TREATY, pmbl. The Treaty of
Rome, organized around the four principles of free movement of goods, services, capital, and people
(id., arts. 3(a)-(c), 9-37, and 48-73), contains provisions creating a Commission that supervises a 12,000-
employee bureaucracy, a Council of Ministers from the Member States, European Parliament, and a
European Court of Justice (id. arts. 137-199), and includes articles providing for Community policies in
the areas of competition (id arts. 85-91), agriculture (id arts. 38-47), transportation (id arts. 74-84),
economic and monetary union (id art. 102(a)), social policy (idt arts. 117-128), economic and social
cohesion (i.e., regional assistance) (id arts. 130(a)-130(e)), research and technological development (id
arts. 130(f)-130(q)), and the environment (id arts. 130(r)-130(t)), all of which extend its scope far
beyond the bounds of the broadest trade agreement. From the very conception of the European
Community, many Europeans have favored the idea of a federal political union. PAUL JOAN GEORGE
KAPTFEYN & PIETER H. VERLoREN VAN THEMAAT, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES 1-4, 21-28 (Lawrence W. Gormley ed. 1989); WALTER LAOUEUR, EUROPE IN OUR TIME
116-125 (1992). However, whether the European Community should evolve into a federal union or
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NAFTA as a whole. The NAFTA addresses two topics relatively new to
trade agreements: trade in services and transnational investment. In this
respect, the NAFTA is substantially broader than the original General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which addresses only trade in goods, and
achieves a breadth of application that the global trade and investment reg-
ulations are approaching only in the current Uruguay Round of multilat-
eral trade negotiations. In some respects, the provisions of the NAFTA are
much more advanced than the results that can be expected from a success-
ful Uruguay Round.'' At the same time, the progress achieved on energy
was very limited. Even so, energy will remain, in a living, growing NAFTA,
a topic of discussion, diplomacy, and negotiation in this much more broadly
defined context. Both the progress and the limitations can be found in the
specific provisions of the NAFTA chapter on energy and the Mexican res-
ervations to its scope and coverage.
D. The Mexican Reservations as to Scope and Coverage
The most important exception in the chapter on energy is the reserva-
tion' 12 of these "strategic activities" to the Mexican State. 113 The Mexican
State reserves to itself exploration and exploitation of crude oil and natural
gas; refining or processing of crude oil and natural gas; and the production
of artificial gas, basic petrochemicals, and their feed stocks and pipelines." 4
Also reserved are foreign trade, transportation, storage, distribution,
remain essentially an economic entity remains a controversial issue. See, e.g., MARGARET THATCHER,
THE DOwN NG STREET YEARS 727-728, 742, 759-763, 814-815 (1993) and AXEL KRAUSE, INSIDE THE
NEW EUROPE 240-250,322 (1991). Therefore, although it is technically a trade agreement, the Treaty of
Rome is also an agreement on a wide range of economic matters atid possibly a constitution for a
nascent federal Europe, and it is highly questionable to cite its provisions on free movement of services
and capital, or their effect on the EEC Tu.&r' scope, as precedeatts for functionally equivalent
provisions in any other trade agreement.
111. Hufbauer and Schott state that the investment provisions of the NAFTA provide a "useful
model" for future GAT trade accords and that these provisions are "far superior" to the results
produced in the TRIM (Trade Related Investment Measures) negotiations in the Uruguay Round.
They recommend that the TRIM's negotiators replace those results with an investment code based on
the NAFTA. HUFBAUER & Scio-r, NAFTA: AN ASSESSMENT, supra note 1, at 3, 84. With regard to
intellectual property, they say that the NAFTA has become the benchmark by which the Uruguay
Round and other international trade negotiations will be measured. Ia at 90. See Charles S. Levy &
Stuart M. Weiser, The NAFTA: A Watershed for Protection of Intellectual Property, 27 INT'L L. 671
(1993).
112. A reservation, a comnon device in multilateral treaties, is a unilateral statement made by a
Government by which it excludes or modifies the effect of certain provisions of the treaty or other
unilateral agreement in their application to that Government. ROBERT L. BTEDSOE & BoLESLAW A.
BOc7_K, INTERNATiONAL. LAW DICTION4AN 264 (19w7). Reservalw'5a must b, 4stmshe4 tom
other statements, such as understandings, interpretive declarations, and political assertions, that are not
intended to have a legal effect. M.N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 468 (1986). The principal problems
with reservations arise where in a multilateral treaty a party attempts to make a reservation not
accepted by the other signatories, a problem not present in the NAFTA. See BLEDSOE & BOCZEK,
supra, at 264-67; SHAW, supra 467-72; and JOSEPH M. SWEENEY ET. At-., THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
SYSTEM 967-79 (1981).
113. North American Free Trade Agreement Annex, Mar. 1993, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Annex 602.3
para.1, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA, Annex].
114. Id. para. 1(a).
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including the "first-hand sales" (that is, the first commercial transaction
affecting the good in question, 115 of such products as crude oil, natural and
artificial gas, goods obtained from the refining or processing of crude oil
and natural gas), and basic petrochemicals.'
1 6
The Mexican government also reserved to itself the supply of electric-
ity as a public service in Mexico, including the generation, transmission,
transformation, distribution, and sale of electricity. 1 7 Finally, it reserved
to itself exploration, exploitation, and processing of radioactive materials,
the nuclear fuel cycle, the generation of nuclear energy, the transportation
and shortage of nuclear waste, the use and reprocessing of nuclear fuel and
the regulation of their applications for other purposes, and the production
of heavy water."" The reservation, however, does not include coal and
related products. 119 The reservation includes investment in strategic activi-
ties and the provision of services therein. 20 Clearly, the most important
consequence of the reservation is that foreign investment in the Mexican
petroleum industry will continue to be impossible so long as Mexico main-
tains the reservation. 21 If these reservations conflict with other provisions
of the Agreement, then the reservations prevail to the extent of the
inconsistency. 22
Although the Agreement provides the protection of the national treat-
ment principle for investments across the borders of the parties,' 23 private
investment is not permitted in the activities to which these reservations
apply.' 24 The provisions of the Agreement on services apply to the activi-
ties covered by the reservations only when Mexico permits a contract to be
115. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 609 (definition of "first-hand sale").
116. NAFTA, Annex 602.3 para. 1(b), supra note 113.
117. Id. para. 1(c), supra note 113.
118. Id. para. 1(d).
119. See id.
120. President Salinas has been quoted to the effect that Mexico will need US $ 30 billion to
develop its petroleum industry in the years 1991-1995. K. Shawn Kirksey, Comment, Energy and Free
Trade: A New Look at the Current Needs of Mexico's Petroleum Industry, 28 TEX. INT'L L. J. 539, 541
(1993).
Hufbauer and Schott, economists at the Institute for International Economics, state that while
Canada and the United States would benefit from relaxation of the restrictions on energy, Mexico
would gain the most. HUFBAUER & ScioTr, NAFTA: AN AssEssMErN, supra note 1, at 34.
Murphy, who believes that foreign investment may be precisely what is needed to reverse the
decline in the Mexican hydrocarbon industry, proposes the use of a subsidiary state corporation to act
as a trustee for foreign investors, who would have beneficial trustee rights (derechos de fideicomisario)
as determined by Mexican law. Ewell E. Murphy, The Dilemma of Hydrocarbon Investment in
Mexico's Accession to the North American Free Trade Agreement, 9 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L.
261, 271-72 (1991).
121. NAFTA, Annex 602.3, supra note 113.
122. Id.
123. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1102, para. 2 provides that each party must "accord to investments
of investors of another Party treatment no less favorable that it accords, in like circumstances, to
investments of its own investors with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management,
conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments." Id. 1, art. 1102, para. 2.
124. NAFTA, Annex 602.3, para. 2, supra note 113.
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granted in respect of such activities and only to the extent of that
contract. 125
However, the reservation provides that the parties must permit end-
users and suppliers of natural gas, together with any relevant state-owned
enterprise, to negotiate supply contracts when those suppliers consider that
such contracts may be in their interest.-26 The parties are required to leave
the modalities of the implementation of such contracts to the end-users,
suppliers, and any state enterprise of the party.' 27 The modalities of imple-
mentation may take the form of individual contracts between the state
enterprises and each of the other entities and be subject to regulatory
approval."2 Each party is required to allow its state enterprises to negoti-
ate performance clauses in its service contracts. 29
It should be noted that the reservations exclude the activities of Mex-
ico's state energy enterprises, but do not exempt the entire subject of
energy from the rules of the NAFTA.'30 The Agreement implicitly recog-
nizes this aspect of the reservation, inter alia, by including additional reser-
vations pertaining to energy. 3' It is also implicitly recognized in the
provision that stipulates that reservation is to prevail if other provisions of
the NAFTA conflict with it in particular applications. 3 2 The implications
of this reservation in practice will be determined by experience under the
NAFTA.
It seems that the reservation is carefully crafted to protect Mexico's
historic political interest in preserving its sovereign control over the petro-
leum industry. Since the reservation is essentially a unilateral act accepted
by the other parties to the Treaty, Mexico remains free to reduce the scope
of its reservation at any time, to the extent its interests may require and its
political necessities may permit. It is difficult to forecast, at this time, what
needs might lead Mexico to follow this course of action. The most impor-
tant aspect of the reservation is not that Mexico wishes to exclude PEMEX
from the disciplines of open international trade, but rather that the other
parties to the NAIFTA must respect the unique role of this state-owned
enterprise in Mexico.
In the United States, these reservations have caused great disappoint-
ment to participants and observers of the negotiations. That Mexican his-
tory suggests that these reservations were inevitable provides little
consolation to those who were hopeful that the ideals of a free and open
international economy could be made applicable to energy trade and
investment throughout the North American continent. Yet the whole of
the Agreement does offer important commitments for trade and invest-
125. Id.
126. Id. para. 3.
127. It.
128. Id.
129. Id. para. 4.
130. See generally NAFTA, Annex 602.3, supra note 113.
131. See text infra, notes 200-14.
132. NAFTA, Annex 602.3, supra note 113, para. 1(d).
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ment in energy. In addition to the general principles the NAFTA estab-
lishes for energy, these additional commitments can be found in the more
specific rules of the chapter on energy.
E. Import and Export Restrictions
The parties, all contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade, reaffirmed their commitment to the GATT principles with
respect to energy by stating that they "incorporate the provisions of the
[GATT] with respect to prohibitions or restrictions on trade in energy and
basic petrochemical goods."' 33 This provision is a specific application of a
rule more generally applicable to all goods.1 34 Essentially, the most impor-
tant provisions of the GATT concern the granting to all other contracting
parties of the GATr "most-favored-nation" advantages with respect to
customs duties and charges,135 the sharing of negotiated bound tariff rates
among all the GATT parties, 136 national treatment with respect to internal
regulations and taxes,137 the general elimination of all quantitative restric-
tions, 38 and other commitments regarding non-tariff barriers. 39
Of these GATT commitments, the most significant for energy is that of
national treatment. The result of these provisions is that none of the par-
ties will be able to discriminate in their enacted laws and regulations on the
basis of the national origin of the energy goods.140 Such discrimination
could otherwise take a variety of forms, but examples relevant to energy
include requirements that portions of a product originate domestically, dis-
criminatory internal taxes, and prohibition of marketing foreign oil or coal
to domestic buyers.14 1 Imports into one country must be accorded treat-
ment no less favorable than the treatment given similar domestic products
in the laws, regulations, and other requirements concerning their sale, dis-
tribution, or use.' 42 Requirements that specific proportions of the product
133. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 603, para. 1. This provision is similar to Article 902 of the
USCFTA, in which Canada and the United States reaffirm their rights and obligations under the GATT
with respect to energy goods. USCFrA, supra note 10, art. 902. "Restriction" is defined to mean "any
limitation, whether made effective through quotas, licenses, permits, minimum or maximum price
requirements[,] or any other means." NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 609.
134. See NAFYA, supra note 1, art. 309, para. 1. This use of parallel articles providing national
treatment for all goods and for energy goods originated in the USCFTA. Compare USCFTA, arts. 407,
408, 409 and arts. 902, 903, & 904. These obligations with respect to energy goods were not in any way
more onerous than those for goods in general. See id. Essentially, in the USCFTA negotiations,
agreement was reached on these principles with respect to energy goods earlier in the negotiations and
then extended to all goods in general. It was .evidently useful to emphasize the importance of these
provisions with respect to energy goods, and that practice was followed in the NAFrA as well.
135. GATT, supra note 8, art. II.
136. lat
137. Id. art. III.
138. Id. art. XI.
139. See generally GATr, supra note 8.
140. For comment on analogous provision in USCFTA, see Department of Energy-United States
Trade Representatives, Memorandum, at 5 [hereinafter DOE-USTR, Memo].
141. Battram & Lock, supra note 97, at 352.
142. See USCFIA, supra note 10, and for comment an analogous provision see DOE-USTR,
Memo, supra note 140, at 5. For natural gas, two major actions of the Federal Energy Regulatory
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be from domestic sources are prohibited by the National Treatment Princi-
ple.143 However, under the rules which the NAFTA incorporates from the
GATI, these provisions do not apply to governmental procurement or to
subsidies by governments.'"
In addition, the parties were careful to emphasize that the GATT pro-
visions prohibit minimum or maximum export price requirements 4 s or
minimum or maximum import price requirements in any of the circum-
stances'" in which any other form of quantitative restrictions would be
prohibited.14 7 However, this reaffirmation of existing obligations under the
GATT cannot be treated as merely a reiteration of existing obligations,
since their. incorporation into the NAFTA provides the parties with the
remedies and other procedures the NAFTA affords to its respective
parties.
It should be noted that these important GATT principles are subject
to waivers, exceptions, and other limitations. For the energy industries,
one of the most important exceptions has been that of Article XXI, which
provides that nothing in the GATT will prevent "any contracting party
from taking any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its
essential security interests relating to fissionable materials ... [or] relating
... to such traffic in other goods and materials as is carried on directly or
indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military establishment."' 148 Recent
history has provided situations in which such leading powers as the United
States, joining with allies and other supporting nations, have imposed eco-
nomic sanctions for political reasons, for example, the sanctions against
Commission evidently regarded by the U.S. Government as being consistent with the proscriptions
against discriminatory regulatory actions are: Order No. 500, Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines
After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, 52 Fed. Reg. 30,334 (1987) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 2, 284); and
Opinion No. 256,Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America, 37 F.E.R.C. 1 61,215 (1986). See also Battram
& Lock, supra note 97, at 352.
143. See Battram & Lock, supra note 97, at 352 for comment on analogous provision in USCFTA.
144. "The provisions of this Article [Article III] shall not apply to laws, regulations or requirements
governing the procurement by governmental agencies of products purchased for governmental
purposes and not with a view to commercial resale or with a view to use in the production of goods for
commercial sale." GATT, supra note 8, art. III, para. 8(a). Subsidies are addressed in Article III, para.
8(b).
145. The GATr provides that no prohibitions or restrictions may be instituted or maintained by
any contracting party on the importation or exportation of goods with respect to another contracting
party except by means of "duties, taxes or other charges." Id art. XI, para. 1. According to Professor
Jackson, it was evidently the intent of the drafters to complement the limited permissibility of customs
duties and charges under Article II. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 315. Therefore, the governments who
are contracting parties may not maintain maximum or minimum prices. However, other articles of the
GATT provide for exceptions to the rules of Article XI. See, e.g., GATT, supra note 8, arts. XII, XX,
XXI.
146. This reference to the circumstances in which any form of quantitative restriction is prohibited
excludes those circumstances in enforcing quantitative restrictions for purposes permitted by the
GATT, such as those applied for balance of payments purposes. See CGAIT, supra note 8, art. VII.
147. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 603, para. 2. See also USCFTA, supra note 10, art. 902, para. 2.
148. Id. art. XXI, para. (b). Professor Jackson points out that Article XXI may shelter some
protectionist measures that are ostensibly imposed for security reasons. Oil quotas maintained by the
United States were cited by Professor Jackson as a measure which has been labeled a security measure
and considered by many to be protectionist in nature. JACKSON, supro note 8, at 752.
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Libya'4 9 and more recently those imposed against Iraq. The Agreement
therefore recognizes that there may be circumstances in which a party
imposes restrictions on importation or exportation of energy products with
respect to a country that is not a signatory to the Agreement. 50 In that
event, a party is permitted to prohibit or limit the importation of energy
products from the territory of another party where the energy products had
been imported from a country outside the NAFrA.15 ' In similar circum-
stances, a party is also permitted to require as a condition of export of such
energy or petrochemical good that the product be consumed within the
territory of the other party.'
52
If a party adopts or maintains restrictions on the importation or expor-
tation of an energy or petrochemical good with respect to countries that are
not parties, any party may request consultations to prevent such restric-
tions from creating distortion or undue influence with pricing, marketing,
or distribution arrangements in any other party.' 53  This provision
originated in the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement to address the eco-
nomic problems that would be created by the imposition of such measures
as oil import fees. 54 Because it would be difficult to predict the conse-
quences of such measures unless both the measure and the situational con-
text were specified, in the U.S.-Canada negotiations it was decided to
provide for consultations at the time of the imposition of such measures. 55
This solution was particularly advantageous since neither party to that
agreement could foresee at the time of the negotiations any circumstances
that would lead to such measures.' 56 These considerations continued to be
apposite for these provisions in the NAFTA.
149. As stated in the joint memorandum by the Department of Energy and the Office of the
United States Trade Representative, the comparable provision in the U.S.-Canada Free Trade
Agreement (art. 902, para. 3) meant that the United States could continue to implement its prohibitions
against the importation of Libyan or Iranian crude oil as well as continues its sanctions against the
importation of South African uranium without violating that Agreement. DOE-USTR, Memo, supra
note 140, at 7-8.
150. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 603, para. 3. See also USCFIA, supra note 10, art. 902, para. 3.
151. NAFYA, supra note 1, art. 603, para. 3. See also USCFTA, supra note 10, art. 902, para. 3(a).
152. NAFIA, supra note 1, art. 603, para. 3(b). See also USCFTA, supra note 10, art. 902, para.
3(b). "Consumed" means "transformed so as to qualify under the rules of origin set out in Chapter
Four [of NAFTA] (Rules of Origin), or actually consumed." NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 609. These
definitions are essentially the same as those found in the USCFTA. These provisions permitted the
United States to continue to impose requirements that crude oil exported to Canada be consumed in
Canada. See Exports of Crude Oil to Canada for Consumption or Use Therein, 50 Fed. Reg. 26,145
(1985) (codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 377).
153. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 603, para. 4.
154. See USCFTA, supra note 10, art. 902 (3) and DOE-USTR, Memo, supra note 140, at 7-8. The
historical background of the oil import quota program through 1969 is given in CARL H. FULDA &
WARREN F. SCHWARTZ, REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INv mrENT 306-363 (1970).
155. DOE-USTR, Memo, supra note 140, at 9.
156. The Reagan Administration, which negotiated the USCFTA, was very clearly opposed to the
imposition of oil .mport fees and had no overwhelming pressures to impose them. Although some in the
oil industry wanted oil import fees as a solution to the low oil prices that discouraged drilling in the
middle 1980s, the industry was far from united on the issue.
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Under the chapter on energy, each party is permitted to administer a
system of import or export licensing for energy or basic petrochemical
goods, if the system is operated in a manner consistent with the provisions
of the Agreement. 157 The provisions here particularly cite the Agreement's
commitment to the principles and provisions of the GATT and the Agree-
ment's provisions on Monopolies and State Enterprises. 58  However, the
Mexican government reserved to itself the right to restrict the granting of
import and export licenses for crude oil, natural gas, and a large number of
other petroleum products.'5 9 The sole purpose was to reserve foreign trade
in those goods to-itself.' This reservation was necessary in order for the
Mexican government to prevent private entities from conducting interna-
tional trade in energy products.
F. Permissible Export Restrictions
Despite these limitations, the Agreement permits a party to adopt
export restrictions under certain carefully defined circumstances.'
6 1 How-
ever, the circumstances under which they may be adopted are severely lim-
ited in comparison to the prior possibilities under applicable GATT law.
First, the restriction must be justified under the applicable articles of the
GATT.161 Those articles restrict the use of quantitative restrictions to
those situations in which they are applied temporarily to relieve critical
shortages of products essential to the exporting party or to enforce meas-
ures undertaken for reasons related to domestic shortages or other adverse
economic conditions. Secondly, the restriction must not reduce the propor-
tion of total export shipments of the specific energy or basic petrochemical
good made available to that other party, relative to the total supply of that
good provided by the party maintaining the restriction available in the rep-
157. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 603, para. 5.
158. id., art. 1502.
159. These included schedule numbers 2707.50; 2707.99; 2709; 2710; 2711; 2712.90; 2713.11; 2713.20;
2713.90; 2714; and 2901.10. NAFTA, Annex 603.6, supra note 113.
160. Id
161. NAFTA, supra note 10, art. 605. See also USCFrA, supra note 48, art. 904.
162. Id The GATT, Article XI, paragraph 2, provides for exceptions for prohibitions or
restrictions necessary to prevent or relieve shortages of foodstuffs or other products essential to the
exporting party, import or export restrictions necessary to the classification, grading, or marketing of
commodities in international trade; and important restrictions on any agricultural or fisheries product
in any form necessary to the enforcement of governmental measured for certain specified purposes.
Another GATT article provides that, where the measures are not applied in a manner which would
constitute a means or arbitrary or unjustified discrimination between countries where the same
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, contracting parties are permitted to
adopt or enforce measures relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if. such
measures are made in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption IGAT'T art.
XX(g)]; measures undertaken in pursuant of obligations under any intergovernmental commodity
agreement which conforms to criteria submitted to the contracting parties and not disapproved by them
[GATT art. XX(h)]; and measures involving the restriction on exports of domestic materials necessary
to ensure essential quantities of such materials to a domestic processing industry at a time when the
domestic price is held below world level as part of a domestic stabilization plan [GATr art. XX(i)].
GATT supra note 8, art. XX.
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resentative period.163 Thirdly, the party must not impose a higher price for
exports of any such good to the other party than the price charged when
consumed domestically.' In particular, measures such as licenses, fees,
taxation, and minimum price requirements may not be used. 65 Fourthly,
the restriction must not require the disruption of normal channels of supply
to that other party, nor may the restriction require the disturbance of nor-
mal proportions among the specified energy or basic petrochemical goods
supplied to that other party, for example, between crude oil and refined
products and among different categories of crude oil and of refined prod-
ucts. 166 However, these provisions do not apply to relations between the
other parties and Mexico because of its individual reservation.' 67 There-
fore, so long as Mexico continues its reservation, they essentially incorpo-
rate and continue existing obligations under the U.S.-Canada Free Trade
Agreement. 68
However, these provisions represent a significant reduction in the
scope of the exceptions permissible under the GAT.' 69  Undoubtedly,
these further restrictions were possible in part because the GATI princi-
ples were to be applied to a more narrow category of trade and to a smaller
number of countries. Here, the restrictions must not only comply with the
GATT law but also with the three concurrent conditions added by the
Agreement. However, unless Mexico decides to alter its reservation to this
article, this provision represents merely a continuation of obligations
already obtained in the negotiations for the U.S.-Canada Free Trade
Agreement.
G. Export Taxes
The Agreement prohibited, without condition, qualification, or reser-
vation, the adoption or maintenance of any duty, tax, or other charge on
the export of any energy or basic petrochemical good to the territory of
another party, unless such duty, tax, or charge is adopted or maintained not
only on exports of any such good to the territory of all other parties, but
also on such goods when destined for domestic consumption. 170 This prohi-
163. The representative period is the period that compares to the proportion prevailing in the most
recent thirty-six month period for which data are available prior to the importation for the measure or
such other representative period on which the parties may agree. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 605(a).
For comments on the comparable provision in the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, sometimes
called the "proportional access clause," see Plourde, supra note 97, at 51-54.
164. This restriction does not apply to a higher price that may result from a measure taken
pursuant to paragraph (b) that only restricts the volume of exports. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 605(b).
165. 111
166. Id, para. (c).
167. NAFTA, Annex 605, supra note 113.
168. Compare USCFTA, supra note 10, art. 904, with NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 605.
169. In commenting on the comparable provisions in the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, the
U.S. executive branch stated, "[t]he effect is to strictly limit the ability of either Party to disrupt its
energy exports to the other Party. The narrowing of these exceptions, together with the narrowing of
the GATT's 'national security' exception in Article 907, represents a major benefit for U.S. energy
security." DOE-USTR, Memo, supra note 140, at 13.
170. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 604. See also USCFrA, supra note 10, art. 903.
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bition affects the public policies only of Canada and Mexico, since the
United States Congress is prohibited from imposing export taxes by the
United States Constitution.'71 Such export taxes would be equivalent to
minimum export price requirements, which are elsewhere prohibited in the
Agreement. 172 This prohibition imposes an obligation on the three parties
beyond their obligations as contracting parties of the GATT, since the
GAT' does not forbid export taxes. 73
H. Energy Regulatory Measures
The parties recognized that energy regulatory measures are subject to
the disciplines of national treatment, import and export restrictions, and
export taxes. 74 Energy regulatory measures are defined as "any measure
by federal or sub-federal entities that directly affects the transportation,
transmission or distribution, purchase or sale, of an energy or basic
petrochemical good.' 17" In particular, energy regulatory measures must
observe the GAT discipline of national treatment generally applicable
among the three parties that arose initially from their respective GATT
participation and was renewed in the NAFrA.1 76 In addition, the parties
must seek to ensure that their domestic regulatory bodies avoid the disrup-
tion of contractual relationships as much as possible and provide for the
orderly implementation of regulatory measures.177 These provisions are
171. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 5.
172. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 603, para. 2.
173. Article XI of the GATI, the provision most generally applicable against the contracting
parties' export measures, specifically excludes taxes, and Article II contemplates schedules of
concessions on tariffs only with respect to imports. See GAIT, supra note 8, arts. II, para. l(b) & XI.
Canada imposed eyp.rt taxes on energy in the 1970s. See DOE-USTR, Memo, supra note 140, at
12.
174. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 606.
175. l& art. 609.
176. Id. art. 606. The National Treatment standard for the NAFTA incorporates certain provisions
from the GATT. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 301. The national treatment principle is extended to states
and provinces by providing "treatment no less favorable than the most favorable treatment accorded by
such state or province to any like, directly competitive or substitutable goods, as the case may be, of the
Party of which it forms a part." Id. art. 301, para. 2. The National Treatment standards in the GAIT
essentially provide that the products of any contracting party imported into the territory of another
contracting party must be "accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like products of
national origin with respect to all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale,
purchase, transportation, distribution or use." GATT, supra note 8, art. III, para. 4. See also id. art. III.
para. 1 (indicating that regulations must not be used to afford domestic products protection) and id. art.
III, para.. 5 (prohibiting internal quantitative restrictions imposed by regulation on private purchasers).
177. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 606, para. 2. This provision addresses a long-standing concern,
initially raised in the negotiations for the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, that regulatory agencies
could overturn commercial contract provisions. Despite advocacy of "sanctity of contract," negotiators
recognized that it would be impossible in the context of an international trade agreement to guarantee
that provisions in contracts would not be overridden by subsequent regulatory decisions. Moreover,
such a provision, though facially neutral, might have discriminatory effects. However, it was recognized
at that time that national regulatory systems could cause distortions in bilateral energy trade. The
solution in the U.S.-Canada Free Trade agreement was merely to create a special consultation process.
DOE-USTR, Memo, supra note 140, at 17.
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likely to have their greatest effects on the natural gas' 7 ' and electricity
industries.
This NAFTA article succeeds a provision of the U.S.-Canada Free
Trade Agreement that addressed concerns about energy regulatory actions
that would result in discrimination against imported energy goods inconsis-
tent with the principles of the U.S.-Canada agreement. The Free Trade
Agreement with Canada essentially provided for consultation.179  How-
ever, the NAFTA's provision represents an advance over that accord in
addressing these problems more substantively.'8s
Both the language181 and the history"s of this provision indicate that
this provision addresses not merely facially discriminatory regulations, but
far more importantly, regulations with implicit or unintended discrimina-
tory effects. The article in the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement from
which it was derived arose from discussions among the negotiators con-
cerning the two countries' respective regulatory practices, 8 3 and particu-
larly Opinion 256 issued by the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission."' However, the history suggests this prior provision was
intended to address discrimination that directly results from regulatory
measures; evidently, discrimination not directly resulting from such meas-
ures would not be included.8 5 Even with this limitation, the implications
of this reinforcement of the national treatment principle are undoubtedly
178. With regard to natural gas, Conine contends that natural gas could be a more significant item
of trade between Mexico and the United States, that the usual barriers of tariffs and import quotas have
never been major obstacles to trade in natural gas, and that governmental decisions the terms of such
transactions are the most common impediments. Conine, supra note 13, 622-23. He examines four
options for eliminating these barriers, id. at 674-84, and concludes that the negotiation of a free trade
agreement is probably the best of the four, id. at 680. Although the NAFTA as negotiated only
partially solves the problems that Conine has presented with regard to natural gas, it does provide a
forum and a process for pursuing the general commitment to sustained, gradual liberalization as it
applies to natural gas.
179. USCFTA, supra note 10, art. 905, para. 1. As between the United States and Canada, this
provision for consultation continues to apply, since the NAFrA does not abrogate the U.S.-Canada
Free Trade Agreement. See NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 101-105, 2201-2206. However, the NAFT7A
provisions prevail as between Canada and the United States in the case of conflict. Id. art. 103, para. 1.
180. The Department of Energy noted this point in its comments on the prior comparable section
of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, DOE-USTR, Memo, supra note 140, at 18.
181. In particular, the second paragraph, which guarantees that each party will seek to "avoid
disruption of contractual relationships" and "provided for orderly and equitable implementation" of
regulatory measure," NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 606, para. 2, clearly demonstrate concern over the
impact of regulatory measure within natural gas markets. The first paragraph incorporates by reference
the parties' commitments under Article III of the GATI to treat imported products no less favorably in
"all laws, regulations, and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase,
transportation, or distribution, or use." Compare id. para. 1, with GAIT, supra note 8, art. III, para. 4.
The use of the term "affecting" indicates a broad application to cover any measure that might
"adversely modify" conditions of competition between domestic and imported products. JACKSON,
supra note 8, at 288.
182. DOE-USTR, Memo, supra note 140, at 15-19.
183. Id. at 17.
184. Opinion 256, 37 F.E.R.C, 1 61,215.
185. Id. at 16.
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numerous.1 16 This result is particularly true for the natural gas industry
with its complex interaction of law and economics. Because the three par-
ties to the NAFTA may address the same economic problems differ-
ently,"8 unintended distortions with discriminatory effects may need to be
addressed pursuant to this article. The movement toward deregulation,
particularly with regard to natural gas in the United States and Canada,
1 88
may tend to alleviate some of these consequences, but the potential for
economic distortion will linger. It is fortunate that the NAFTA addresses
these problems, even if only with general principles, and provides a forum
for their resolution.
. National Security Measures and other Provisions
The Agreement prohibits the adoption or maintenance of measures
restricting imports or exports of energy or basic petrochemical goods
among the parties for the purpose of protecting national security unless
specified conditions are met.189 However, this article, which is continued
from the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement,19° confers no rights nor
imposes any obligations on Mexico. 9 This prohibition governs the rela-
tionship even where such measures are permitted under Article XXI of the
GATr, the GATF's major provision for a national security exception, or
Article 2102 of the NAFTA, its own general national security exception.
92
However, the parties are permitted to have such restrictions where they are
necessary to supply a military establishment, or to permit fulfillment of a
critical defense contract of a signatory government, to respond to a situa-
tion of armed conflict involving the party taking the measure, to implement
national policies or international agreements relating to the non-prolifera-
186. See generally Stickley, supra note 97.
187. Stickley shows that in the transportation of natural gas, the Canadian government has used a
rate design providing a "straight" division into fixed and variable costs, the former assigned to the
demand charge paid by the customer regardless of the volume of purchase and the latter to the
commodity charge paid on the basis of volume purchased, a type of rate structure that has not been
used in the United States for several decades. The United States, however, has assigned a portion of
the fixed costs to the commodity charge, but its policies on rate design for transportation of natural gas
have been evolving. Stickley suggests that these differences will have an impact on Canadian exports of
natural gas to the United States. Id. at 355, 360-62. Conine states that Mexico's state-enterprise
operated system produces "decisions that are more restrictive" than those in Canada and the United
States. Conine, supra note 13, at 664.
188. See generally Stickley, supra note 97.
189. NAFrA, supra note 1, art. 607.
190. See id. While recognizing the fundamental importance of energy to national security, Canada
and the United States concluded at the time of the negotiations for their bilateral trade agreement that
the agreement, together with "their friendship, proximity, and close defense relationship" (e.g., their
common membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, inter alia), meant that the much
broader exception provided in the GATT "was no longer appropriate and could even be detrimental
... to the energy security of each." DOE-USTR, Memo, supra note 140, at 24. In the past,
protectionist and nationalist policies had "inhibited trade, discouraged development, and exacerbated
shortages." Id at 25. The elimination of many restrictive regulations by both parties made a more
narrow exception for national security not merely possible, but positively beneficial. See id
191. NAFTA, Annex 607, para. 1, supra note 113.
192. NAFI'A, supra note 1, art. 607.
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tion of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or to respond
to threats of disruption in the supply of nuclear materials for defense pur-
poses.193 The NAFTA has more general provisions on National Security;194
however, the provisions on national security in the chapter on energy pre-
vail over these more general provisions.'95 It should be noted that while all
three parties remain bound to their GATT obligations and therefore con-
fined to the restrictions of Article XXI of the GATT, the parties have
simultaneously limited the use of measures restricting exports and imports.
The parties also agreed that they would allow existing or future incen-
tives for oil and gas exploration, development, and related activities in
order to maintain the reserve base for these energy resources.196 These
provisions specifically contemplate governmental incentives,' 97 such as tax
exemptions or favorable tax treatment for certain investments, or
subsidies. 19
The United States and Canada agreed to preserve the existing provi-
sions of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, to act in accordance with
the terms of certain provisions, 199 and to incorporate those provisions into
NAFrA.2° However, these provisions do not apply to Mexico, on which
they neither confer rights nor impose obligations.20 1 Both signatories to
the Agreement on an International Energy Program,2 °2 Canada and the
193. Id.
194. Id art. 2102. This article utilizes the language of Article XXI of the GAiT for the most part.
However, it deletes the language that provides for the protection of interests "relating to fissionable
materials or the materials from which they are derived" and substitutes "relating to national policies or
international agreements respecting the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices...." Compare GAIT, Art. XXI with NAFTA art. 2102. Arguably, the language in
the NAFTA is more narrow, since it focuses the meaning on proliferation concerns and therefore
excludes actions related to the non-military uses of nuclear materials. It should be noted that, at the
time of the negotiation of the GAIT in 1947, the United States was one of the few nuclear powers in
the world. In contrast, the Bush Administration, which negotiated the NAFTA, came into office with
the proliferation of nuclear weapons, missiles, and chemical and biological weapons as one of its
greatest foreign policy concerns. Conversation between the author and Ambassador Dennis Ross, an
advisor to the President-Elect and the Secretary of State Designate, and subsequently the Director of
Policy Planning in the Office of the Secretary of State, and now Director of the office of Middle East
negotiations, in which he stated that one of the greatest concerns of the incoming administration was
"proliferation - nuclear, missile, and biological and chemical weapons." (contents on file with Tulsa
Journal of Comparative and International Law). On chemical weapons proliferation see conversation
between President Bush and National Security Advisor Scowcroft, MiCHAEL R. BEsCHLOSS & S'rROBE
TALBOT, AT THE HIoHEsr LEVELS 119-120 (1993).
195. Note the language introducing Article 2102 "Subject to Article 607 Energy - National
Security Measures," and the inclusion of the specific reference "under Article 2102" in Article 607.
NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 2102,607.
196. Id art. 608, para. 1. See also USCFTA, supra note 10, art. 906.
197. In the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, Article 906 is titled "Government Incentives for
Energy Resource Development." USCFrA, supra note 10, art. 906.
198. The complex issue of subsidies was not resolved in the negotiations for the U.S.-Canada Free
Trade Agreement. Battram & Lock, supra note 97, at 348, 360-61.
199. USCF'A, supra note 10, Annexes 902.5, 905.2.
200. NAFrA, Annex 608.2, supra note 113, para. 1.
201. Id.
202. Agreement on an International Energy Program, supra note 83. This Agreement has as its
purpose the attainment of a "common emergency self-sufficiency" in energy through the members'
1993]
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United States expressly stated that they intended no inconsistency with the
provisions of that agreement and that in the case of any inconsistency, the
International Energy Program Agreement prevails.2 "3 This provision is
also a continuation of the understandings reached in the conclusion of the
U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement.2 4
J. Additional Provisions Affecting Energy
It is important to recognize that because of the comprehensive nature
of the NAFTA, trade and investment across borders will be affected by
provisions outside the Chapter on Energy. Energy will be included as tar-
iffs are eliminated on substantially all products traded among the three
North American nations on a phased basis.20 5 These effects will arise not
only from the substantive provisions on investment, competition policy,
and governmental procurement, but also from the procedural provisions of
the Agreement.
The chapter on investment assures most-favored-nation treatment
2°6
and national treatment2' for transnational investments within the
maintenance of emergency reserves, id. art. 1; their preparation of programs of demand restraint, id.
art. 5, para. 1; cooperation on allocation of supplies, id. art. 6, para. 1; their common procedures for
activation and deactivation of emergency measures, id. art. 12; and their establishment of a common
information system, id. art. 25. This organization was established by members of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, see id. at pmbl. and art. 71, whose twenty-four members,
including the United States and Canada (but not Mexico) were eligible for membership in the
International Energy Agency. Id. art. 71. See Plourde, supra note 97, discussion at 43-46.
203. Agreement on International Energy Program, supra note 83, annex 608.2.
204. USCFTA, supra note 10, art. 908.
205. Each Party is obligated to eliminate progressively its customs duties on the products
originating in its territory according to its schedule annexed to the Agreement. NAFTA, supra note 1,
art. 302, para. 2. No Party is permitted to increase its existing tariffs or create new tariffs on products
originating in its territory. Id para. 1. Goods are divided into five categories, which provide for
different periods for the phased elimination of the tariffs. NAFTA, Annex 302.2, supra note 113, para.
1.
U.S. and Canadian tariff rates average about .5% ad valorem for crude petroleum and 1% for
refined petroleum products, while Mexican tariffs average 5% and 8.6% on the same products
respectively. These tariffs will be eliminated over a ten-year period. These reductions are not expected
to have effects on the volume of trade in these products. U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION,
POTENTIAL IMPACT ON THE UNITED STATES ECONOMY AND SELECrED INDUSTUES OF THE NORTH
AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGR9EMENT 18-2 (USITC No. 2596 Jan. 1993).
206. Article 1103, paragraph 1 of the NAFTA, provides that each party must accord to investors of
another party "treatment no less favorable than it accords, in like circumstances, to investors of any
other Party or of a non-Party with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management,
conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments." NAFrA, supra note 1, art. 1103,
para. 1. Para. 2 extends this same guarantee to the "investments of investors." Id. para. 2.
207. Article 1102, paragraph 1 of the NAFrA, provides that each party must "accord to investors
of another Party treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own
investors" with respect to the same investment activities as it provides most-favored-nation treatment,
and paragraph 2 of the same article extends this guarantee to the "investments of investors." Id. art.
1102, paras. 1, 2. Significantly, the national treatment provisions also prohibit the parties from
imposing on investors a requirement that a minimum share of ownership ("equity") be held by its own
nationals, other than with respect to nominal qualifying shares for directors or incorporators. Id. para.
4(a). This provision would tend to keep Mexico from retreating from the historic liberalization of its
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NAFTA's geographic area.2°8 Additionally, the NAFTA provides for mini-
mum levels of protection for investors2' and restricts the use of perform-
ance requirements. 210 As a general rule, investors from one party will be
able to invest in assets in another party on an unrestricted basis and with-
out discrimination. This general rule is severely limited in the case of the
energy industries of Mexico. Additionally, the NAIFTA permits the Cana-
dian and Mexican governments to require their approval for acquisitions of
assets worth more than certain specified limits.211 More significantly, the
Agreement allows Mexico to reserve to itself investment in certain "strate-
gic activities, '212 which essentially includes most energy-related activities, a
provision that results from Mexico's constitutional provisions. However,
the more general rules in the Agreement create a presumption in favor of
free flows of capital and investment, a policy that is limited only where
there are specific exceptions.211 Additionally, the trend in Mexican public
policy has recently been toward liberalization of investment policies, as
many in Mexico recognize that Mexico needs to attract capital to finance
continued economic progress. Therefore, the Agreement builds a founda-
tion for future liberalization of restrictions on investment.
The NAFTA provision on competition policy prohibits unfair discrimi-
nation and anti-competitive practices by monopolies and state enterprises
with respect to investments originating from other NAFTA parties.2"4
Implementation of these provisions may necessitate changes in Mexican
laws and regulations governing PEMEX, the most important state enter-
prise in Mexico. From the effective date of the Agreement, allegations of
discriminatory treatment will create issues that can be addressed through
the procedures established by the NAFTA.
The provisions on government procurement liberalize the practices of
such state enterprises as PEMEX. From the effective date of the Agree-
ment, fifty percent of the Mexican government's procurement will be avail-
able for bidding by suppliers from the other parties to the NAFTA. 215 This
portion will be increased to one-hundred percent over a period of ten
years.21 6 However, these standards are limited to purchases of more than $
former requirement that at least fifty percent of the equity of all businesses in Mexico be owned by
Mexican nationals.
208. Daniel M. Price, An Overview of the NAFTA Investment Chapter: Substantive Rules and
Investor State Dispute Settlement, 27 INT'L L 727 (1993).
209. NAFrA, supra note 1, art. 1105, para. 1.
210. Id. art. 1106.
211. The NAFTA permits Mexico to continue to review investments of more than US $ 25 million,
to increase progressively to US $ 150 million, while Canada is permitted to review investments of more
than C $ 150 million. The United States is permitted to continue reviewing investments in firms that
raise national security concerns in accordance to the Exxon-Florio provisions of the Omnibus Trade
and Competitiveness Act of 1988. HUFBAUER & ScHoTT, NAFTA: AN ASSESSMENT, supra note 1, at
82.
212. NAF1'A, Annex 602.3, supra note 113, para. 1.
213. See generally NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 11 (This chapter deals with investment).
214. Id& art. 1501, para. 1; See generally art. 1502, para. 3 and art. 1503, paras. 2, 3.
215. NAFTA, Annex 1001.2a, supra note 113, para. 2.
216. Id
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250,000 of goods and services and $ 8 million in construction services. 2 "
Although U.S. suppliers already have a significant share of the Mexican
market, it is expected that these changes will result in significant increases
in sales of petroleum equipment and supplies.
After the effective date of the Agreement, the activities and partici-
pants in the energy sector will also be affected by the administrative and
institutional provisions which provide the procedural assurances designed
to make the substantive provisions effective. In addition to requiring pub-
lication of laws, regulations, procedures, and administrative rulings,218 the
NAFTA requires that administrative proceedings be conducted only after
reasonable notice with an opportunity for a fair hearing has been given to
affected parties21 9 in accordance with procedures provided by law.220
These provisions also require procedures for the review of administrative
proceedings.221
Of less immediate importance to the energy industries are the provi-
sions on review and dispute settlement in anti-dumping and countervailing
duty matters.22 Most importantly, the NAFTA creates a "Free Trade
Commission" 2' to supervise implementation of the Agreement and out-
lines the procedures for dispute settlement. 24 These provisions are impor-
tant protections designed to make the other, more substantive articles
more effective.
IV. THi NAFTA IN PERSPECTIVE
Among the many provisions of the NAFTA, the negotiations on
energy provoked initially the greatest apprehensions in Mexico and ulti-
mately the greatest disappointment in the United States.2' The United
States negotiators worked assiduously to persuade Mexico to liberalize its
energy sector.22 6 However, rumors during the negotiations that President
Salinas de Gotari had "sold the national patrimony" forced the Mexican
President to reaffirm his commitment to the Constitutional provisions on
government ownership of energy resources.22 7 The Advisory Committee
for Trade Policy and Negotiations2' warned Mexico that its economic
217. NAFTA, Annex 1001.1c, supra note 113.
218. NAIFTA, supra note 1, art. 1802.
219. Id. art. 1804.
220. Id. cl. (b); (c).
221. Id. art. 1805.
222. Id. arts. 1901-11.
223. 1d. arts. 2001-02.
224. Id. arts. 2003-19. Jeffrey P. Bialos & Deborah E. Siegel, Dispute Settlement Under the NAFTA:
The Newer and Improved Model, 27 INT'L L. 603 (1993).
225. PASTOR, supra note 1, at 45.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. The Advisory Committee on lade Policy and Negotiations is an official advisory committee
consisting primarily of representatives of United States businesses established to advise the United
States Trade Representative and other United States Government trade negotiators on trade policy and
its impact on U.S. business. Id.
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future depended on its ability to "overcome historical trepidations about
removing outmoded, statist controls in important sectors such as
energy." 229 It concluded that "shortfalls in the agreement on energy [were]
an unfortunate remnant of Mexico's isolationist past and in no way a prece-
dent for future negotiations."' ° In particular, the petroleum industry in
the United States welcomed the liberalization that was achieved, but was
disappointed that more was not accomplished."3 However, substantial
progress was made in opening the energy sector of the Mexican economy.
Perhaps the greatest disappointment to United States negotiators and
business was the failure to open the energy sector to foreign participation
in the ownership of resources. Arguably, it is to Mexico's own advantage
to relax its constitutional provisions, since such liberalization would permit
a capital inflow helpful in improving and maintaining the technological
proficiency of the Mexican energy sector. However, it must be recognized
that such a course was fraught with immense domestic political difficulties
in Mexico. In view of Mexican history and the symbolic importance of oil,
it seems likely that any intrusion into such a sensitive area would have pro-
voked great political trouble in Mexico and would jeopardize Mexican rati-
fication of the Agreement.
A related, though equally inevitable failure was to move Mexican
energy trade away from government control. The reservation specifically
recognizes that the Mexican government has "reserved to itself" trade in
energy. However, the existence of a state monopoly in petroleum substan-
tially precludes trade in oil and natural gas on a commercial basis. In the
struggle to open world trade since the negotiation of the GATT, the liber-
alization achieved as a result of elimination of trade barriers has foundered
whenever it encountered state-owned enterprises. It is exceedingly diffi-
cult to ensure that such enterprises will make decisions on a commercial
basis.3 2 No truly free trade can exist in the energy sector until the Mexi-
229. ADVISORY CoMMrrrEE FOR TRADE POLICY AND NEGOTIATIONS (ACTPN), A Report to the
President, the Congress, and the United States Trade Representative Concerning the North American Free
Trade Agreement, Sept. 1992, at 42-43 quoted in PASTOR, supra note 1, at 45.
230. Id.
231. The Oil & Gas Journal, a leading industry journal, predicted that energy companies in the
United States would benefit, but not as much as they had hoped. NAFTA Due to End Most Barriers to
Trade Among U.S., Mexico, Canada, 90 OIL & GAS J. 30 (Aug. 24, 1992). According to the Journal, the
American Petroleum Institute, which represents the larger, vertically integrated petroleum companies,
concluded that the Agreement would produce economic benefits for all three countries participating,
but regretted that the NAFTA failed to liberalize opportunities for investment in Mexico. Id. at 31. It
reported that Cambridge Energy Research Associates and Arthur Anderson & Co. had issued reports
forecasting that the agreement would increase exports of natural gas to Mexico. Id. For the petroleum
equipment and supply industry, the reduction in tariffs from twenty percent to sixteen percent the first
year and the subsequent phased reductions and the opening of procurement by PEMEX would be
helpful. Id. at 30.
232. Consumers and enterprises are assumed to make purchasing decisions on the basis of price,
quality, and other criteria that reflect their own interests. Where an enterprise is owned by the
government, or where all trade is conducted through a state trading monopoly, decisions are likely to
be made at least partly on the basis of other criteria. Similarly, the prices of goods supplied by state-
owned enterprises are almost sure to reflect criteria other than those resulting from the processes of the
market economy. Indeed, in the formerly socialist economies of Central and Eastern Europe and the
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can government relinquishes control over foreign trade in petroleum and
privatizes the Petroleos Mexicanos.
Although the chapter on energy liberalizes energy trade among the
three countries in many respects, one of the greatest benefits is that it
clearly defines the principles for international economic activity in North
America. First, the chapter reinforces the application of the GATT princi-
ples and rules to energy. It reimposes the GATT disciplines, particularly
the principle of national treatment, on the regulation of the energy indus-
tries and provides a process for resolving disputes. It prohibits export and
import duties and taxes on energy products. These obligations to liberalize
trade are modest but real. Moreover, it makes additional commitments to
liberalize beyond those rules. Secondly, the NAFTA adds clarity and defi-
nition to the restrictions on investment in the Mexican energy and provides
investors with more "transparent" rules. It establishes some general disci-
plines on state-owned enterprises, and it separates state decision-making
from state enterprise decision-making by requiring administrative trans-
parency. Thirdly, the NAFTA's provisions recognize half a decade of
reform of the energy sector in Mexico and binds the Mexican government
against a retreat from these reforms. 33 Finally, the NAFTA commits the
parties to the principle of liberalization, which is mandated on a gradual
but sustained basis.
Progress in liberalizing international trade has always been made on
the basis of what has been possible, rather than what is ideal. The energy
provisions of the NAFTA Agreement are no exception. Its real impor-
tance is the commitment of the three nations to sustained, though gradual,
liberalization. Nevertheless, the NAFTA establishes a broad foundation
for further progress toward the free movement of goods, services, and capi-
tal among the three great nations of North America.
former Soviet Union, decisions on purchasing and pricing products were made on the basis of the
government's plan. The contracting parties to the GATT have struggled with this problem throughout
its history. See DAM, supra note 82, at 316-32; and JACKSON, supra note 82, at 283-98.
233. As reported in the Oil & Gas Journal, John Easton, the Deputy Secretary at the Department
of Energy, observed that the NAFFA's energy chapter had reduced the risk of future governmental
intervention into energy markets and that further liberalization was possible. NAFTA Due to End Most
Barriers to Trade Among U.S., Mexico, Canada, supra note 231, at 30-31.
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